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## II.—On Grote's Theory of the Structure of the Iliad.

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GROTE's theory of the structure of the Iliad is stated and defended in the second volume of his History of Greece, which was published in 1846. It was noticed in reviews of the new history in some English and American magazines. Most of these articles, I believe, I have seen, but I do not find in any of them a minute, careful examination of the new theory on a critical basis. The discussion is from a literary point of view and of a general character, containing little more than the expression of opinions. In Germany it seems to have been thought worthy of more thorough consideration. Several scholars whose names are familiar to students of Homer discussed it with different results. Friedländer published in 1853 a book in which he adopted and defended it. Düntzer in the *Jahrbücher für Philologie* (2d Supplementband, 1856) claimed to have already published nearly the same view, though he refused assent to the precise form which Grote proposed. Ribbeck attacked it from the Lachmann standpoint in *Philologus* (1853), aiming to show that Grote was wrong, not in throwing out what he did, but in regarding the rest as a self-consistent poem. Finally, W. Bäumlein in *Philologus* (1856) subjected the theory to critical examination from the conservative point of view, and concluded by rejecting it as merely one of many attempts, equally unsuccessful in his judgment, to break down the unity of the Iliad. Thus being approved by some and rejected on conflicting grounds by others, it seems still fairly open to discussion. It may indeed be thought that the long silence of English scholars on the subject is an argument for its own continuance, as showing that no one cares to have it interrupted, but, as the theory confronts every student of Homer or reader of Grote's history, it may be reasonable to suppose that some would be interested or profited by a discussion of it. I ought perhaps in the outset

to say that I have no new theory of the *Iliad* to propose. My purpose is simply critical, or, if you please, destructive; it is to take up the statements and arguments of Grote and see if they bear examination. I do not mean to argue either for or against the unity of the poem. Into those larger questions of the authorship and integrity of the poem I do not enter. Of course I shall not knowingly rest any argument on a line or passage which is reasonably or generally suspected. Nor shall I try to evade an argument by suggesting new suspicion of the text. Here is the poem, which certainly received its present form from somebody, though we know not who it was or when he did his work. Our question may really be only as to the success or failure of a compiler or editor, but that is a fair subject for discussion in connection with a theory which aims to go behind such a man's work and show his materials uncombined; does the poem as it stands admit this analysis? In my examination of the subject I have made great use of Bäumlein's article above mentioned, and wish to acknowledge fully my debt to him. Part of the same material is also to be found in Bergk's *History of Greek Literature*, but in the general plan and many particulars I have followed Bäumlein.

Grote's theory may be stated best in his own words (*History of Greece*, II. p. 175 f. Am. edition):

"The first book, together with the eighth, and those from the eleventh to the twenty-second inclusive, seem to form the primary organization of the poem, then properly an *Achilleis*; the twenty-third and twenty-fourth books are perhaps additions at the tail of this primitive poem, which still leave it nothing more than an enlarged *Achilleis*. But the books from the second to the seventh inclusive, together with the tenth" (and here he might have added the ninth also), "are of a wider and more comprehensive character, and convert the poem from an *Achilleis* into an *Iliad*. The primitive frontispiece, inscribed with the anger of Achilles and its direct consequences, yet remains, after it has ceased to be co-extensive with the poem. The parts added, however, are not necessarily inferior in merit to the original poem: so far is this from being the case, that amongst them are com-

prehended some of the noblest efforts of the Grecian Epic. Nor are they more recent in date than the original: strictly speaking, they must be a little more recent, but they belong to the same generation and state of society as the primitive Achilleis."

In support of this theory, the first statement made is that in the books of the original Achilleid "the sequence of events is more rapid, more unbroken, and more intimately knit together in the way of cause and effect" than in the others. If this difference is tested by the impression made upon a reader by the two parts of the poem, there would be room for difference of opinion. It is hardly possible to expect general agreement in such a matter. If it be tested by the number of incidents crowded into a day, the difference is not very great. Following Faesi's analysis, there are twenty-one days covered by the first book, the twenty-second day covers five books and nearly a sixth (ii. 1-vii. 380), the twenty-third and twenty-fourth days some fifty lines each, then the twenty-fifth day three books (viii.-x.), the twenty-sixth day eight books (xi.-xviii.), the twenty-seventh day four books and a few lines more (xix. 1-xxiii. 108), then two comparatively short or empty days, and some twenty in the last book. Of course these long periods in the first and last books are made up by groups of ten or twelve days which are mere intervals in which nothing is narrated. Throwing these out, the other single days cover from fifty to some five thousand five hundred lines each, and all differ in length. In this point of view not much distinction can be made between the parts of the poem which Grote regards so differently. But let us grant that there is a distinction of the kind he suggests; does it prove difference of origin or relation to the whole poem? Are not such differences in the rate of movement to be looked for in any poem on so large a scale? Look at the *Odyssey*. There the distribution of days is much more even—many of them covering about the length of an average book. Only the fifth book corresponds to the first and last of the *Iliad* in containing in its limits twenty-one days. But there are two pivots of the action, two important points, one the narrative

of Odysseus's return told by himself, the other his arrival in his own house and vengeance upon the suitors. At each of these the time is crowded; the first, occupying one night, covers five books (viii.-xii.), and at the second the events of two days extend over seven books (xvi.-xxiii.). This parallel case, where Grote admits no division, illustrates the scheme of days in the *Iliad*. The introduction and the close cover between them forty-two days in two books, where long intervals, of little action for the purpose of the poem, are condensed into a few lines. Of the intervening eight days, four are briefly dispatched, but the other four, containing the struggles of the Greeks without Achilles, his return, and the killing of Hector, belong to the crises of the story and cover respectively three, five, six, and eight books. There is in this respect nothing true of the *Iliad* which is not equally true of the *Odyssey*, and nothing true of either which would not be equally true of any poem expanding a single selected point in a long story. As to the alleged impossibility of stopping anywhere between books eleven and twenty-two, so as to break apart the separate songs, that may trouble one of the Lachmann school but not one who discusses the poem as a whole. Mr. Grote goes on to say that there could never have been a separate poem called *Patrokleia* ending with the death of Patroklos, because he is so subordinate a character, "standing to Achilles in a relation of dependence, resembling that of Telemachus to Odysseus." The illustration is perhaps unfortunate, because recent investigators have regarded a *Telemacheia* as one of the constituents of the *Odyssey*. The remark itself, however, is open to question. What Patroklos did in his brief flash of action might as well be a distinct song, one would think, as the achievements of any hero in the long war. If we had not the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, some critic might well suggest that no such poem as these could be constructed on the events of ten or twenty days in a war of ten years and a subsequent wandering of another ten.

The next general argument that Grote adduces is summed up in a few words on the next page (178) of the history, that "the consequences of the anger of Achilles do not appear

until the eighth book." In other words, the poet, after concentrating our attention in the first book on that anger and the consequent promise of Zeus to Thetis, seems to lose entirely from his thought for the next six books the fulfilment of that promise. This remark seems to rest upon the idea that a purpose thus formed and expressed must be put into immediate, if only partial, execution. Such an idea holds good, one may say, as what ought to be in the sphere of morals; but does it apply to poetry? Is the method of art conformed to it? Is it not rather the artistic plan, adopted from the experience of life, to defer the fulfilment of a promise or a purpose, to interpose and remove obstacles one by one, to vary the success on both sides in a conflict, to make the finally defeated party prove itself hard to defeat? All these things contribute to the suspense and so to the interest in the hearer's or reader's mind, and seem essential to the building up of a story in due proportion. Nor does this degree of artifice belong to a more developed stage of art than that in which the *Achilleid* must have been composed. The poet who imagined that dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon in the first book, with its skilful delineation of the growing anger in the words of each from vague to precise threats, from sarcasm and taunt to defiance and denunciation, was certainly equal to such simple and natural development of the subsequent plot. A similar delay, too, occurs at the end of the *Achilleid* when Achilles declares (xviii. 114 f.) a purpose to go at once to find and slay Hector, but one thing after another comes in to put off the execution of that purpose, so that it does not come until late the next day, in the twenty-second book. This I mention only to show of what the poet's art was capable.

Again it may be remarked that such prompt fulfilment as Grote requires of the promise of Zeus is not in harmony with the character of the God and of his government as shown in any part of the Homeric poems. He does not in either poem work out promptly, firmly, and openly a plan which he has independently and wisely formed. He is not, in the Homeric conception, a being strong enough to have in himself the

ultimate decision of questions on which the gods are divided. There is a fate dimly shadowed behind him, and when by the materialized device of a balance he learns what that fate is in a given case, he must execute it, though his heart is filled with pity for the losing side. Even then he acts irregularly and inconsistently, somewhat like the conventional oriental despot who gets things done somehow when he insists upon it, but has not the intellect or the energy to inspire obedience and secure efficient government. He alone knows certainly what the fate is, and with this knowledge and a consciousness of power, he lets the other gods fight among themselves, laughs at their wounds, and indolently allows them to outwit him and almost succeed in thwarting his plan, but always in the end has his way and executes the fate. Even in the Achilleid, after his promise to Thetis, a prayer from Agamemnon touches his pity and he sends (as again in xiii. 821 f.) a favorable prodigy which gives the Greeks a temporary success (viii. 246-252). Again, in book xiv. he lets himself be seduced by Hera into a sleep, during which Poseidon stimulates the Greeks so that they drive back the Trojans from the ships and Hector is carried off stunned and senseless. In the thirteenth book, too, still within the Achilleid, Poseidon without the knowledge of Zeus secures a success for the Greeks on the left wing, while Zeus himself inspires the Trojans in the centre of the line; but it is Hector without help from Zeus who finds out and in a measure repairs the injury caused by Poseidon. His favor varies from one side to the other even in book xvii., in the battle over the body of Patroklos. Grote himself notices the inconsistencies in the action of Zeus, but only at one point where they afford him an argument for his theory. He speaks (p. 189) of the attitude of Zeus at the beginning of the fourth book as irreconcilable with that in the first and eighth books, saying that he "discusses nothing but the question of continuance or termination of the war, and manifests anxiety only for the salvation of Troy," forgetting all about his promise to Thetis. He seems in this criticism to overlook entirely the words with which the first speech of Zeus in book iv. is introduced:

αὐτίκ' ἐπειρᾶτο Κρονίδης ἱρεθίζεμεν Ἥρην  
 κερτομίους ἐπέεσσι, παραβλήδην ἀγορεύων·

“Zeus at once attempted to exasperate Hera with taunting words and deceitful speech.” This plainly means that the speech which follows is designedly insincere and may be expected to conflict with his words and deeds elsewhere. And when in the next speech he reproaches Hera with her hatred of Troy, but still, though unwillingly, consents to her desire to destroy it, there is nothing in that inconsistent with his promise to Thetis, for the fulfilment of that promise by bringing Achilles again into the field secured the victory of the Greeks. In thus requiring that Zeus should begin at once to make his taking the Trojan side perceptible, Grote seems then to require something not in keeping with the character of the god as conceived by the poet, nor yet with his action in the Achilleid itself.

Again, it is not easy to see what valid objection there is to the common conception of the Iliad, that it was in the intent of the poet, as far back as we can see, to bring out in the first half of the poem the inability of the other Greek heroes to make good the absence of Achilles. It is certainly worth observing how carefully this purpose seems to be carried out, in bringing forward each one of the principal heroes in turn to bear the burden of the fight. It may be said indeed that these separate instances are interpolations, or rather enlargements of the poem by subsequent additions of whole books, in the interest of other chiefs. That may perhaps be true of the tenth book, for instance, which most critics agree in regarding as a later addition. But on examination it does not appear that these ἀριστεῖναι of other chiefs are confined to the part of the poem which Grote would reject. Menelaus is made prominent in iii. and xvii., Diomedes in v., Aias Telamonius in vii. and xv., Agamemnon has his turn in xi., and Patroklos in xvi. All these displays of valor are actually conditioned upon the absence of Achilles from the field, and are at the same time poetically conditions of his return to it. They are actually conditioned upon his absence, for apparently there would be no occasion or room for them in the story, were he



present. They are poetically conditions of his return, because as the poem stands, it seems that the poet designedly postponed his return until after they had all been worked into his plot. Now how does Grote deal with this view of the relation of these books to the rest? That they contain the "attempts of the other heroes to compensate for the absence of Achilles," says he, "is noway borne out by the poet himself. From the second to the seventh book, Achilles is scarcely alluded to. \* \* \* He is mentioned two or three times as absent, and Agamemnon (ii. 377) regrets the quarrel, but we never hear any such exhortation as 'Let us do our best to make up for the absence of Achilles.'" (Note, p. 192.) As to this last remark, it is true there is no such exhortation to be found in those books, but it is also true that there is none in the much longer passage of the poem included in book viii. and books xi.-xvii. inclusive, that is, in the whole Achilleid before his return—so that the remark should have no force as an argument against books ii.-vii. The only approach to such a remark is made when Hera in v. and Poseidon in xiii. and xiv. exhort the Greeks not to let the absence of Achilles make so much difference in their success. As to the frequency of reference to Achilles, there are twenty places where his name occurs in the three thousand four hundred lines of these books, and in the books of the Achilleid in which he does not take part in the action (viii., xii.-xv.), containing three thousand one hundred lines, there are only fourteen references to him. Grote further remarks that these books (ii.-vii.) show "not the insufficiency of all the other heroes without Achilles, but the perfect sufficiency of the Greeks under Diomedes, Agamemnon, etc., to make head against Troy." The object of the Greeks however was not to make head against Trojan attack, but to capture the city by defeating utterly the Trojan army, and this they cannot do in these books—nor do they make any appreciable progress towards it. There is very little fighting, comparatively, in these books, for there is none at all in ii., and almost none in iv., while iii. and vii. are taken up with the two duels of chosen champions, and vi. with Hector's visit to Troy. So the only book full of fighting is

the fifth, where the Greeks certainly have the advantage on the whole, but not more than they do afterwards at the beginning of xi., until their chief heroes are wounded. Of course, in speaking of the relative valor and success of the two parties in the Homeric battles, one must not leave out of view the influence of the gods, which is continually exerted, first on one side, then on the other. It may truly be said, I think, that no hero gains striking advantage on either side, without an explanation of it by reference to the help of a deity; and hence to trace the varying successes of the two sides, it is only necessary to note the intervention of the divine power here or there. Grote seems to lose this fact out of sight for the moment when he speaks (in the same note) of the glory of Diomedes as beyond that of Achilles; for the successes of Diomedes are due to the presence of Athene in his chariot, stop when she leaves him, and never approach to the feat of Achilles in killing Hector. The want of prompt fulfilment of the promise of Zeus to Thetis is due simply to the intervention of other deities which Zeus allows or which for a time goes on without his knowledge, and it is not confined to books ii.-vii. The change from Greek success to Trojan success is gradual, but it must begin to be perceptible somewhere. Why should not that first marked success come in the eighth book, without casting suspicion on the six books that precede it? Athene, as has been mentioned, gives the Greeks their success in v. Then in viii. she and Hera start from Olympus to help them again, but are intercepted and sent back by Iris as the messenger of Zeus. After that they do nothing directly to aid the Greeks, who suffer in consequence. But Hera in xiv. seduces Zeus to slumber, and meanwhile Poseidon does his part to put off the fulfilment of the promise to Thetis by helping the Greeks most actively. Previously too in xi. Agamemnon has driven the Trojans back from the camp to the very walls of Troy, and Zeus himself sends word to Hector not to risk a conflict with him, but to keep out of the fight until Agamemnon is wounded and withdraws. Thus Zeus himself, as has been pointed out before, allows a temporary triumph to the Greeks within the limits of the Achilleid,

a fact which shows that similar successes of the Greeks in books ii.—vii. ought not to be used to cast doubt on the genuineness of those books.

The next point to be considered is the criticism of the way in which this enlargement, as Grote considers it, is connected at each end with the rest of the poem. At each place there is in his opinion an awkwardness or difficulty which marks the union of old garment and new cloth. At the beginning of the second book the awkwardness is that the dream and its false message "produce no effect. For in the first place Agamemnon takes a step very different from that which his dream recommended, and in the next place, when the Grecian army is at length armed and goes forth to battle, it does not experience defeat, but carries on a successful day's fight." To test the justness of this criticism (which, by the way, betrays the same desire to have results brought about at once which has already been noticed), let us ask: Why does Zeus send the dream at all? Evidently to induce Agamemnon to do something which without the dream he would not be so ready to do—that is, of course, to lead out his army to battle. Why should Agamemnon need such encouragement to do this, but for the plague and the retirement of Achilles? This incident then grows naturally out of the first book, and something like this was almost necessary to bring on the fighting in which sooner or later the Greeks were to feel the need of Achilles. It resembles very closely the treacherous suggestion made by Athene to Pandaros, whereby the contest is reopened in breach of the truce, in the fourth book. The dream then plainly produces its effect, though not immediately. Agamemnon trifles with the army, and, when they take in earnest his proposition of an instant return home, the intended effect of the dream is almost defeated; but as soon as that mistake is corrected the designed consequences do follow in the marching out of both hosts to battle. Again the duel between Menelaus and Paris postpones the general combat, but, after that is over, on the same day comes the fighting of books iv.—vii. There is no fighting at all mentioned in the first book, and only a single passage (490 ff.), where Achilles is

said to abstain for twelve days from going to the agora or into battle, may be thought to imply it. How then should the poem go on from that first book? As it does in the eighth book, Grote would answer. But then at the very beginning of that book we find Zeus (10-17) forbidding the gods to aid either party—which command Athene (33-37) at once interprets as unfavorable to the Greeks, but promises to obey. This implies previous participation of some gods in the fighting, which has occurred with the express consent of Zeus in iv. and v. but has not been at all suggested if books ii.-vii. are omitted. In a note (p. 185), Grote modifies his opinion so as to include the dream, taking in the first forty-seven lines of the second book into his Achilleid, and going on from there to the eighth book. This is including, however, a little too much, for the last six lines of these forty-seven describe Agamemnon's dressing himself, and represent him as putting on his ordinary clothes for peaceful life, throwing his sword over his shoulder, and taking his sceptre in his hand. This is all right for the second book, where he goes out to call the Greeks to an assembly. But in the eighth book the first thing told of him is that in the midst of battle, about noon, he with other chiefs is terrified by the hostile thunder of Zeus, and retreats before the enemy. Now that description of his going forth in peaceful array to the ships of the Greeks is certainly left purposeless, and is inconsistent with what follows, if we go on from there to the eighth book. Suppose these six lines be dropped, and we read on from ii. 41 into the eighth book, then the difficulty remains that the dream should be so narrated and no subsequent reference ever made to it. In the prayer of Agamemnon himself in viii. 228-244, which he introduces by reference to former vows and boasts of the Greeks and bases upon his past offerings at the altars of Zeus, there is no allusion to this dream. The poet may well have forgotten the dream since three thousand five hundred lines have intervened, but could he at the distance of only two hundred lines?

But what shall be said of the false suggestion made by Agamemnon to the assembled army, which becomes the point

of junction between Achilleid and Iliad, if the Achilleid went on from ii. 41 (or 47) to viii. 1? How can that be explained? Grote says the object was to introduce the splendid picture of the sudden breaking up of the assembly and the interference of Odysseus to bring the men back, together with the episode of Thersites. Thus he intends, if I understand him, to suggest that this part was an addition when the enlargement was made. Surely this is not a necessary and hardly a probable inference. Why should not such a scene be introduced and in such a way by the supposed poet of the Achilleid? In what respect is this picture out of place in a poem devoted chiefly to Achilles, any more than the scene at the close of the first book, where Hephaestus acts as cupbearer among the gods, or the elaborate description of Agamemnon's arming at the beginning of the eleventh book? That it comes in just here does not indicate a juncture here of old and new, for there seems to be but one other place in the Achilleid where it could fittingly come, and that is at i. 54. If one may offer a suggestion, it seems more probable, to work back from effect to design, that the poet's object in introducing the scene at all was to increase the glory of the Greek heroes, by showing with what difficulties they had to contend in their own followers—to bring more clearly before the mind the effect on the army of its nine years of fruitless war and absence from home. This, it is true, widens the view to take in the whole war, but not any more than do the *ἀπιστεῖαι* of Agamemnon in xi. and Menelaus in xvii., and the battle of the gods in xx.

Again, at the close of the seventh book, Grote finds similar difficulty in the construction of the wall around the Greek camp, which seems to him to reveal the hand of an enlarger. "As the poem now stands," says he (p. 186), no plausible reason is assigned why "the wall should be built." "Nestor proposes it without any constraining necessity, for the Greeks are in a career of victory," etc. This is certainly too strong a statement. There seems to be sufficient reason for anxiety on the part of the Greeks in the utter disappointment of the hopes with which they entered the battle. These hopes are expressed by Agamemnon in ii. 37, 413-18, and by Nestor in

ii. 436, being founded on the recent dream and looking to the capture of Troy on that day. Instead of such a triumph, though they had fought well and Diomedes by the present aid of Athene had achieved wonders, yet they had gained nothing, and repeatedly (v. 701, vi. 107 ff., vii. 17) they are spoken of as hard pressed and giving way. They are not in a "career of victory," but just holding their own against attack and in danger of being driven back to the ships (iv. 247 f., v. 791). Grote adds: "The Trojans are making offers of compromise which imply conscious weakness." Now this offer of compromise is expressly founded (vii. 351) by Antenor, who proposes it in the Trojan assembly, on the recent violation of the sworn truce by one of his own party, which in his view injures their prospects of success. Priam, apparently having no idea that the Greeks will accept the offer, adds to it a proposition for a truce until the dead are disposed of, with the expressed (vii. 377) intention of renewing the fight after it. But *before this message comes*, Nestor has made in the Greek assembly (vii. 337-43) the proposition to build a wall for the protection of the ships and themselves. And there is no hint in the answer of the Greeks to the Trojan message that they detect a confession of weakness in it. Still, granting that the proposal of a compromise and truce does imply conscious weakness in the Trojans, the fact that Nestor's suggestion of the wall precedes the coming of that proposal is a sufficient answer to the asserted inconsistency between them.

Grote goes on to show how on his theory the mention of the wall-building came to be introduced here. He supposes it to have been introduced because after the "brilliant scenes" in the books from the second to the seventh, it would surprise any one to find a wall spoken of at once in the eighth without any mention of its construction or previous existence, while in the Achilleid, passing at once from the first to the eighth book, there was no such previous success of the Greeks to make the existence of a wall seem strange. In his words, "since the Achilleis immediately after the promise of Zeus to Thetis went on to describe the fulfilment of that promise and the ensuing disasters of the Greeks, there was nothing to

surprise any one in hearing that their camp was fortified." It does not seem quite clear how disasters, following upon and caused by a promise, should make the existence of a previous wall seem natural. The connection between disasters and promise would rather suggest that there had been no disasters and hence no need of a wall before the promise was made. In the first book there is no mention of the wall, though it might well have occurred, especially at 344, where Achilles says Agamemnon cannot plan for the future how the Greeks shall fight safely by their ships, and again at 409, where he asks Zeus to help the Trojans to drive the Greeks to their ships and the water's edge. In the Achilleid the first mention of the walls would be at viii. 177, where Hector speaks with contempt of them. His reference to them agrees better with their recent erection. "I am sure," says he, "that Zeus has appointed victory for me, but woe for the Greeks; fools, who, you see, were building these walls here, weak things, not worth a thought." He would hardly speak so if the walls had stood nine years, although, as a friend suggests to me, this contemptuous language just here may be ascribed to the excitement of success which would make the walls seem now a trifling obstacle in his way. Another reference to the walls as just built occurs in ix. 348-51, but Grote rejects that book. In regard to this wall-building, I do not undertake to defend the seventh book as it stands; I have only tried to show that Grote's criticism of it is open to objection. But there are other difficulties about it, which give probability to Bergk's (*Hist. Gr. Literature*) recognition of a later hand in the form of its account of the building of the wall.

I have now discussed the principal points which Grote urges in support of his general theory, passing over his treatment of the ninth book, because one might accept what he says of that book without accepting his theory of an Achilleid. But I do not wish to stop without noticing that part of his discussion, because it seems open to criticism, and the topic itself is interesting to all students of the *Iliad*. Grote's reasons for rejecting the ninth book may be briefly stated. There are passages in the eleventh, thirteenth, and sixteenth books, in

the mouths of Achilles, Patroklos, Nestor, and Poseidon, which not only wholly ignore, but are inconsistent with, such a previous embassy carrying full apology and offers of restitution and compensation from Agamemnon to Achilles. Nothing more than such an offer is asked by Achilles from Thetis and by her from Zeus in the first book, so that this ninth book ought to end the poem if it belonged with the first. The terror of Agamemnon in the ninth book is neither accounted for by any previous disasters of the Greeks, nor consistent with his valor in the eleventh book. And finally the refusal of the offers by Achilles carries his pride and egotism to an excess such as to shock the Greek sentiment of Nemesis. These last two points may be taken up first, as I shall treat them briefly. The disasters of the Greeks in the previous books do not account for Agamemnon's "abject terror" in the ninth book. Elsewhere Grote has admitted that the disasters of the Greeks begin in the eighth book, and the fact appears strongly emphasized by the encampment of the Trojans outside the wall with the purpose, avowed by Hector, of preventing the Greeks from escaping in their ships under cover of the night. This is the very thing suggested by Agamemnon in the beginning of the ninth book, and for a long time no one knows what answer to make. Moreover it is not he who proposes the embassy, but Nestor, and Nestor too has already proposed, apparently for the first time, the stationing of a guard about the camp. That the fear of Agamemnon here is inconsistent with his gallantry in the eleventh book, shortlived as that display is and solitary, ought not to surprise any one who observes how all the heroes, except perhaps Aias and Diomedes, change often from one extreme to the other. That the obstinate refusal of Achilles to be reconciled to Agamemnon goes "beyond even the largest exigencies of insulted honor" is what one cannot so surely determine for another age and a different race of men. Such nursing of revenge might easily be paralleled from fact or fiction, and certainly cannot be ruled out from the possible conceptions of a Homer by the standard of a scholar and philosopher. And if it shocked the Greek sentiment of Nemesis, as well it might,



do we not find in the poem that sentiment justified by the death of Patroklos, which would not have occurred had Achilles yielded sooner? I know it is denied that this can be regarded as a penalty inflicted on Achilles; I know it is not expressly so explained anywhere in the poem; but I can hardly think any one can read the *Iliad* or hear its story told without so connecting the two events in his mind, even if the ninth book is left out, and much less if it is included. It may be here observed that the idea of Nemesis is much more clearly formulated and recognized in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad*, and in the later Greek poetry than in either; and this may account for the absence of direct reference to it in this connection.

It is argued further by Grote that nothing more is asked by Achilles and Thetis of Zeus in the first book than "that Agamemnon and the Greeks may be brought to know the wrong they have done their capital warrior and humbled in the dust in expiation of it." This he regards as accomplished in the ninth book, so that the further progress of the poem after it is inconsistent. Now what Achilles really asks in i. 408-12 is that by the aid of Zeus the Trojans may drive the Greeks to their ships and the water's edge, slaying them, so that the Greeks and Agamemnon may fully learn their folly in insulting him. In xvi. 61 ff. the same idea recurs. "I intended," says he, "not to lay aside my wrath until the din of battle should have come to my ships." It may be added that this phrase "to my ships" does not occur in the first book, but is to be found in the formal answer sent to Agamemnon, at the extreme of Achilles's wrath, in ix. 650 ff. Now the situation in book viii., though bad enough, as has been said, to justify great disappointment and anxiety on the part of Agamemnon, is not yet bad enough to satisfy that fixed terminus of wrath on the part of Achilles. The Trojans with inspiration from Zeus (viii. 335) drive the Greeks back to the trench and wall and are encouraged to encamp on the field, but they do not yet pass the wall or threaten the ships. Hence the remark of Grote (note, p. 182) that the subsequent defeats of the Greeks are causeless cannot be defended. There is no suggestion in the prayer of Achilles in book i. of compensation

or restitution of Briseis, and so the offers made in the ninth book do not satisfy him—he waits for something else. Now the whole tenor of the ninth book is in entire harmony with these expressions of Achilles in i. and xvi., and constitutes an explanation or expansion of them as well as of the *μηνις οὐλομένη* of the first line of the whole poem, without which expansion, one may boldly say, we should only half understand the conception of the poet. It may be not original, but if not, we must admit that some one else saw better than the first poet what was involved in those words and thus developed it. The speech of Achilles in rejecting the offers of the embassy is a most complete and powerful expression of such a state of mind as is only suggested by his words in i. and xvi. His love of glory in war is gone altogether for the time (316–322). He chooses (393–415) a long, peaceful, quiet life, instead of the brief but glorious career which he decides for in xviii. He dwells continually on the old wrong done to him, repeating it over and over in almost the same words (335 f., 344, 367 f., 375, cf. 646 f.). In the view of such a passion gifts are nothing, and he labors in his language to express fully his contempt for them: not ten or twenty times as many as are now offered, not all the wealth of Orchomenos or Egyptian Thebes, not gifts countless as the sand or the dust (379–85) will pacify him until—what? He repeats here, with this intense emphasis, the idea expressed more precisely in i. and xvi. “Until Agamemnon shall discharge for me the whole bitter outrage” (ix. 387). That line, in that connection, cannot be explained unless by Achilles’s own words, in the Achilleid itself, until the suffering of the Greeks from his absence had reached the limit his passion had fixed. This is the only adequate conception of the “accursed wrath” of Achilles. If we compare with this his speech in xvi., where he gives up in a measure his original purpose and consents to let Patroklos lead his men to battle, we find the same feeling there. He repeats there in 54 and 58 his complaint in nearly the same words. He repeats, as was mentioned above, the same intended limit to his inaction. But he does not speak so strongly in other respects, both because he is addressing his

friend, not the messengers of his enemy, and because he is now laying aside in a measure his former wrath. The rest of the speech will be considered farther on in another connection. This then is the answer to Grote's argument that Achilles asks nothing more than the humiliation of the Greeks and the return of Briseis, and that therefore, to be consistent with himself, he ought to accept the offer made in the ninth book. He does ask something more in i., as he himself says he had in xvi., and with these two passages of the Achilleid his conduct in ix. is consistent, and these are the only places in the poem where he suggests a limit to his wrath.

We take up now the subsequent passages which seem to Grote irreconcilable with the previous occurrence of the embassy of the ninth book, and which constitute the strongest argument against that book.

The first of these is in xi. 609 f., where Achilles, seeing a wounded man borne to Nestor's tent, calls Patroklos to go and learn who it was, and says to him: "Now I think the Greeks will come to my knees in supplication, for their need is no longer to be borne." It cannot be denied that it is strange that in this remark there is no reference to the ninth book; he would naturally say "will come *again*," if the ninth book had preceded. It does not seem, however, "a glaring inconsistency," as Grote calls it, for it appears from the ninth book that Achilles expected to be approached again and again in the same way. At the beginning of his address in answer to Odysseus he says (ix. 309 ff.): "It is best to declare my purpose to you bluntly, \* \* that ye may not come one after another to sit down and coax me." His remark in xi. then seems to mean that he expects what those words in ix. were designed to prevent.

Again in xi. 656-803, in Nestor's appeal to Patroklos to urge Achilles to relent at least so far as to let Patroklos take his armor and go into battle, Grote finds an argument against the ninth book in the absence of any reference to the offers there made. But what place is there for such reference? Remorse for the rejection of that offer would hardly move Achilles if the present disasters of the Greeks did not. And

Nestor had no authority to renew the offer without consulting Agamemnon. Furthermore, there is in the speech a passage which seems to allude distantly, as would be natural, to the fact that an attempt to persuade Achilles had been made and failed. After reminding Patroklos how his father Menoetios had directed him to influence Achilles with good advice, Nestor adds (xi. 790 ff.): "but even now remind him of this, if perhaps he may yield. Who knows but that with a god's help you may move his mind by counsel? There is power in the persuasion of a friend." These words gain meaning if they are taken as contrasting this appeal from a friend with the failure of the formal embassy.

Next comes, in the thirteenth book (95-124), the exhortation of Poseidon to the Greeks in battle, in which, admitting the injury done by Agamemnon to Achilles, he says: "even if he is to blame, it is not for us to be slack in fighting." Then follows a line (115) which Grote translates: "let us make an effort to heal the sore; the minds of good men admit this healing process": ἄλλ' ἀκεῶμεθα θᾶσσον ἀκεσταί τοι φρένες ἐσθλῶν. The rest of the speech refers only to courage in battle. Grote regards this line as quite inconsistent with the supposition that an attempt to "heal the sore" had already been made in the ninth book without success. It would be so certainly, but is the line to be understood as he translates it? His idea seems to rest upon a suggestion made by Heyne in his notes on the Iliad without any argument to support it, which apparently has not been adopted by later scholars so far as I can ascertain. At least Faesi and Passow (in his Lexicon) return to the earlier understanding of the line as referring to making good by valor the loss of Achilles, an exhortation which the same god utters without any possible ambiguity in xiv. 364-375. This suits better the use of θᾶσσον, and the whole context. The line then means in its connection: "Even if Agamemnon is to blame for the absence of Achilles, it is not for us to be slack in fighting, *but let us at once make up the loss; the courage of the brave is not beyond repair.* But do ye no longer, being all chief heroes in the host, neglect your prerogative of valorous defence." On this view, all lack of reference or place for

reference to book ix. vanishes. The conversation between Achilles and Patroklos in xvi. 21-100 and the address of Patroklos to his troops in xvi. 269-274 are the next passages which Grote takes up, and the difficulty that he finds with all of them is the same, that they are inconsistent with the previous occurrence of such an offer of restitution and compensation as is made in the ninth book. It is not perhaps worth while to consider the passages singly; let it suffice to say that while with Grote's conception of the wrath of Achilles, that it would yield at once to the offer of the ninth book, they are fatal to the genuineness of that book, on the other hand if one reads them with the idea of Achilles's wrath expressed by him in i. and xvi., there appears no reason for reference to a premature and unsuccessful attempt to propitiate him, which, when it was made, he treated as an insult. Moreover, as is well suggested by Bäumlein, there is apparent in xi. and xvi. a gradual giving way of the anger of Achilles, which is best explained by the unrecognized effect upon him of the embassy with its offer of atonement. It appears first in his taking interest enough in the combat to stand on his ship and watch it (xi. 600 f.), then in his sending Patroklos to inquire who the wounded man was (611 f.), then in his sympathetic suggestion, when he returns, that it may be pity for the Greeks that makes him come weeping back (xvi. 17 f.), and finally in his permission to him to go into the battle and the eagerness with which he hurries him off (xvi. 80 f., 125-8). A similar gradual change of feeling in the three speeches of Achilles in book ix. is pointed out by Gladstone in his *Homeric Studies*. "I will go home to-morrow," he says to Ulysses; "We will deliberate to-morrow whether to go home or not," to Phoenix; "I will not fight until Hector threatens my ships," to Aias.

The same thing is true of the eighteenth and nineteenth books which has just been said of the sixteenth. The general absence of reference to the ninth book will not seem strange if one has in mind the conception of the wrath of Achilles now suggested, that it made him scorn offers of apology and atonement until it had seen its satisfaction in a full measure

of calamity to the Greek army. The offer made in the ninth book seemed to him of so little importance when made, and is now so driven out of his mind by the death of his friend, that he does not once think of it. His rejection of that offer was but a part of his whole conduct, consistent with the rest, and what he now repents of is the whole, not any part by itself. And why should Agamemnon, in this critical time of reconciliation, risk provoking Achilles again by referring to his refusal of that offer? He does mention, in his only speech bearing upon the quarrel, that he offers now the same gifts as before (xix. 140 f.); but that passage with three others which expressly refer to the embassy of the ninth book Grote regards as interpolations. These passages may well be defended, but there is no room to do it here.

Two other passages, subsequent to the ninth book and seeming to imply it, ought to be mentioned, to which Grote does not refer. One is xi. 794 f., where Nestor says to Patroklos: "But if Achilles is in dread of some oracle and his mother has given him a warning from Zeus, let him send you in his place." Now there is no previous mention of any warning from Thetis to Achilles, except in his words in ix. 410-16. If it be objected that when Patroklos repeats (xvi. 36 f.) this conjecture of Nestor's, Achilles answers (xvi. 50 f.): "I am not in dread of any oracle, nor has my mother warned me from Zeus," the answer is plain that the denial of Achilles means: "That is not my reason for refusing to go into battle." Such a form of expression in Greek is illustrated often, e. g. Ev. Joan. ix. 3. Again, when in xiv. 74-81 Agamemnon for the third time proposes a return home, none of the chiefs present suggests an effort to appease Achilles, or makes any reference to him. Does not this, in the *Achilleid*, consist perfectly with the previous failure of such an attempt, and need explanation if the ninth book is rejected? The first occasion of such a proposition was in ii. 139 ff., when all the chiefs knew it was not made in earnest; the second in ix. 26 ff., when the embassy follows.

Let me now say in conclusion again that my only attempt has been to present what could fairly be said (passing over a

few minor points) in criticism of Grote's theory and of his arguments in support of it. My study of it has impressed me with admiration of his clear view and firm grasp of the substance of the poem, which is the more remarkable when one remembers that this theory forms but a brief episode in the grand movement of his noble investigation of Greek history. His theory may be open to fewer objections than any other, but I do not see how some of the objections to it can be removed. It will perhaps seem to some that my criticisms upon it are concerned with minute points. It is on single lines and phrases, however, that the question must turn in great measure, as there is no ground for argument except in what the poem itself furnishes. On the whole I would rather accept the *Iliad* as it is, considering it a single poem with a poetic freedom in disregarding inconsistencies and subordinating even natural sequence to occasional impulse, than accept Grote's explanation of its present shape.

It may be worth while to add that, so far as I can ascertain, the different investigations seeking in the language or metre of different parts of the Homeric poems a criterion of difference of age, such as Giseke's on the use of prepositions, the order of words, the use of enclitics, etc., Friedländer's on the unique words (*ἅπαξ εἰρημένα*), do not show any distinction between books ii.-vii. and the rest of the *Iliad*.